Introduction
Authentication protocols are used in distributed environments to establish a secure communication and to ensure the identity of the communication partners. With the widespread use of distributed computing (e.g., Internet, electronic commerce), authentication protocols have gained much importance. Because high values can be at stake, such protocols must have extremely high quality and must be resistant with respect to intruders. Therefore, usually formal methods are used for their design and veri cation. In the literature, a variety of di erent methods and techniques for protocol analysis have been developed (cf. Mea94] for an overview). Typically, the methods exhibit their strength in di erent stages of the development of an authentication protocol: in early design stages, type checking can be used to nd out major de ciencies of a protocol and to ensure it is conforming to a development standard AG98]. As a next step, modal logics of belief are used to model a protocol and its properties. Such logics (e.g., BAN BAN89], SVO, GNY, or AUTLOG KW94]) are convenient for the veri cation of important properties, but are relatively weak with respect to modeling intricate intruder scenarios. Here, model-checking approaches (e.g., KW96]) can be used. They can e ciently and automatically analyze a protocol. However, they usually cannot provide a positive proof and are limited by the size of the state-space they can explore. Methods for veri cation which are based on CSP, like Pau97], avoid this problem by simultaneously modeling a potentially innite number of parallel protocol runs, but their computer support is still rather weak.
The tool PIL/Setheo addresses the second stage: PIL/Setheo is capable of automatically proving safety properties of authentication protocols, formalized in the modal belief logics BAN BAN89] and AUTLOG KW94]. PIL/Setheo is based Setheo, an automated theorem prover for rst order predicate logic. { automatic processing: after specifying the protocol and the desired properties, the tool should run automatically. Response-times are to be kept below one minute. { representation level: the protocol and its properties are speci ed in the modal BAN or AUTLOG logic. The transformation into rst-order logic must be kept transparent to the user. Thus, no knowledge about rst-order theorem proving or Setheo should be required to use PIL/Setheo. { human readable proofs: a major bene t of protocol analysis with modal belief logics is that the resulting proofs are relatively short and provide valuable insights to the protocol designer. This is in sharp contrast to model checking techniques (where no proof is provided) and CSP-based techniques which produce rather lengthy and complex proofs. Hence, all proofs are to be presented on the level of the source logic (BAN or AUTLOG) and must be human-readable. { feedback on failed conjectures: during development of a protocol, it is likely that some of the conjectures cannot be proven due to errors in design or formalization. Then, a simple answer \no" (or an endless loop) is rather insu cient. Thus PIL/Setheo has to o er several ways to provide feedback on what might be wrong in case a proof attempt fails.
These requirements are re ected in PIL/Setheo's system architecture. Its input is a speci cation of the protocol's messages, additional assumptions, and the theorems to be proven. The speci cation language, developed for PIL/Setheo Wag97] is close to the underlying modal logic (BAN or AUTLOG). An example for a simple protocol (a variant of the RPC-handshake) is shown in Figure 1A .
This input speci cation in translated into one or more proof tasks in rstorder logic (in clausal normal form). PIL/Setheo uses the approach of metainterpretation which transforms each BAN (or AUTLOG) formula into a term. A newly introduced predicate symbol holds (abbreviated as`) is true, if and only if its argument (a translated modal formula) can be derived using the inference rules of the resp. modal logic. Thus, all inference rules of the BAN (or AUTLOG) logic are transformed into rst-order implications. For details on the translation see Sch97].
These proof tasks form the input of Setheo, is a high performance theorem prover for rst-order logic in clausal normal form Let92]. Setheo features a wide variety of techniques for pruning the search space which is traversed in a depth-rst manner with iterative deepening. When Setheo nds a proof, a treelike model elimination tableau is returned. A proof is this form, however, is not readable. Therefore, it is translated into a human-readable form using the tool ILF-Setheo WS97]. After a transformation into a sequent-style calculus (block calculus), the proof is syntactically converted into a proof of the original BAN (or AUTLOG) logic and type-set using L A T E X. A short example of the output is shown in Figure 1B . This representation of the proof directly corresponds to the representation level of the input of PIL/Setheo (left side of Figure) .
In case, a conjecture cannot be proven, Setheo usually reaches a run-time limit. In order to increase usability of the tool, PIL of producing feed-back in such a case: belief-generation and abduction. In the rst case, PIL/Setheo generates all beliefs which are derivable from the given speci cation and which conform to given syntactic criteria. Let us assume, that we had \forgotten" the last assumption (B believes fresh N b,Assumption 6 ) in Figure 1A . Then, our theorem cannot be proven. In that case, the user can ask PIL/Setheo which kinds of BAN-formulas B believes. PIL/Setheo, which uses a variant of the Delta-preprocessor Sch94] to generate the formulas in a bottom-up way, returns a list of BAN-formulas (in our example 124). PIL/Setheo's user interface allows to further restrict the focus of the formulas by specifying a syntactic lter. For example, we might ask what B believes to be fresh (freshness is an important issue in protocol analysis with BAN-logic). Now, PIL/Setheo returns a much shorter list of formulas (8 in our case). From them, it is quite obvious that there are no terms which contain any reference to fresh- In the abductive mode, additional assumptions (or patterns, like B believes the freshness of each time-stamp) can be given by the user. PIL/Setheo then tries to prove the theorem and returns a list of (most speci c) instantiations of the additional assumptions which were required to nd a proof with given resources. From there, the user easily can nd out those assumptions which might be important for the analysis.
The user interface for PIL/Setheo is straight forward and easy to use.
PIL/Setheo uses the tool \make" to ensure that for a complete analysis all conjectures have been proven. Upon completion, PIL/Setheo returns a L A T E Xdocument containing a full report and all proofs.
Conclusions
We have used PIL/Setheo to analyze a number of well-known protocols (Kerberos, Andrew Secure RPC Handshake, Needham Schroeder, Needham Schroeder with pubic keys, Otway Rees, wide-mouthed frog, Yahalom, CCITT-X.509, ISO-10181 and others). All proof tasks arising from the veri cation of these protocols (with BAN or AUTLOG) could be shown fully automatically within less than one minute per protocol (actual proof times have been below 20 seconds). As far as possible with the formalism of belief logics, we were able to \re-detect" errors in early versions of the protocols. With its fully automatic operation and its capability to generate human-readable proofs in the BAN or AUTLOG logic, PIL/Setheo is a powerful, yet easy to use tool, especially suited for early protocol design phases.
